Recently, Joanna Rutkowska wrote that IaaS cloud services are insecure without hardware support for separation between tenants, citing Bruce Schneier's recent article on cloud insecurity.
However, successful IaaS cloud services like Amazon Web Services are enabled by commodity hardware (using the Intel x86 instruction set), free operating systems (Linux), and the ubiquitous TCP/IP and SSL protocols. Today's IaaS providers already have massive investments in commodity hardware, and hardware support for tenant isolation would seem to be a ways off, both in hardware development and adoption by providers.
I am more concerned about SaaS services and isolation of clients. How I can be sure my Office365, SalesForce, or other SaaS service can successfully and permanently isolate and protect my company's data? I don't see how hardware support for isolation can be extended into the realm of SaaS services unless it is in terms of per-customer encryption of data.
Your thoughts?
Showing posts with label Cloud. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cloud. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
Friday, August 12, 2011
Five Stages of Cloud Acceptance
Denial: We'll never put anything in the cloud because of security/reliability/performance/etc.
Anger: You already put WHAT in the cloud? How are we going to do backups/switch providers/manage identity/etc.???
Bargaining: OK, we'll move X into the cloud if/when the cloud becomes secure/reliable/etc.
Depression: The CFO/CEO/etc. wants us to start using cloud to save money/reduce costs/expand functionality. We can't use the cloud. What about my job running the data center? What about our bandwidth? What about PCI DSS/HIPAA/GLBA?
Acceptance: It works, I can do more to enable my company's business, and reduce capital expenditures. Let's put everything into the cloud!
Seriously, I have had some of these reactions myself. I hear some of these reactions from people when we talk about using cloud services and realize there truly is a road to acceptance for many people.
Anger: You already put WHAT in the cloud? How are we going to do backups/switch providers/manage identity/etc.???
Bargaining: OK, we'll move X into the cloud if/when the cloud becomes secure/reliable/etc.
Depression: The CFO/CEO/etc. wants us to start using cloud to save money/reduce costs/expand functionality. We can't use the cloud. What about my job running the data center? What about our bandwidth? What about PCI DSS/HIPAA/GLBA?
Acceptance: It works, I can do more to enable my company's business, and reduce capital expenditures. Let's put everything into the cloud!
Seriously, I have had some of these reactions myself. I hear some of these reactions from people when we talk about using cloud services and realize there truly is a road to acceptance for many people.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Cloud Computing and the Insider Threat
Something that hasn't been top-of-mind for me, but remains a threat nonetheless, is that the scope of the "insider threat" changes when the cloud is used for computing and storage.
One of the significant data loss vectors is the "insider threat" where a trusted insider -- either unintentionally or maliciously -- leaks protected information in violation of policy or regulations. In traditional datacenters, the trusted insiders are usually the organization's employees and contractors -- the organization should be able to physically and logically account for every individual that has access to the organization's computers and data. The insider threat is one vector that data loss prevention (DLP) is often deployed to help mitigate.
The situation changes in cloud computing, though. An organization that makes use of cloud computing services, whether SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS, is now using computers and storage that can be accessed by more individuals than just the organization's employees and contractors -- the cloud provider actually owns the servers, networks, and storage and employs personnel and contractors that have administrative access to those components. Now the "insider threat" has suddenly expanded to include a whole new group of people beyond just the original organization's employees.
One mitigation technique used to protect data stored in the cloud from any insider is to encrypt the data. Depending on the operating system used, it may be possible to setup volume encryption or folder encryption on which sensitive data can be securely stored. Unfortunately, encryption key management is not easy -- it seems the best (or only) solution to this problem in the cloud is using a key management server to authenticate and authorize encryption keys, and then configure and monitor the key management server carefully.
Another problem with insiders in the cloud is watching for confidential data in motion. DLP would be a solution to this problem in an organization's datacenter, but the situation is more complex in a cloud environment because of a lack of availability of DLP systems in cloud provider networks and the difficulty of separating individual cloud customer's traffic for DLP analysis. This is a problem we're looking into at Palisade Systems.
One of the significant data loss vectors is the "insider threat" where a trusted insider -- either unintentionally or maliciously -- leaks protected information in violation of policy or regulations. In traditional datacenters, the trusted insiders are usually the organization's employees and contractors -- the organization should be able to physically and logically account for every individual that has access to the organization's computers and data. The insider threat is one vector that data loss prevention (DLP) is often deployed to help mitigate.
The situation changes in cloud computing, though. An organization that makes use of cloud computing services, whether SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS, is now using computers and storage that can be accessed by more individuals than just the organization's employees and contractors -- the cloud provider actually owns the servers, networks, and storage and employs personnel and contractors that have administrative access to those components. Now the "insider threat" has suddenly expanded to include a whole new group of people beyond just the original organization's employees.
One mitigation technique used to protect data stored in the cloud from any insider is to encrypt the data. Depending on the operating system used, it may be possible to setup volume encryption or folder encryption on which sensitive data can be securely stored. Unfortunately, encryption key management is not easy -- it seems the best (or only) solution to this problem in the cloud is using a key management server to authenticate and authorize encryption keys, and then configure and monitor the key management server carefully.
Another problem with insiders in the cloud is watching for confidential data in motion. DLP would be a solution to this problem in an organization's datacenter, but the situation is more complex in a cloud environment because of a lack of availability of DLP systems in cloud provider networks and the difficulty of separating individual cloud customer's traffic for DLP analysis. This is a problem we're looking into at Palisade Systems.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Cloud Computing and Protecting Confidential Information
A couple of months ago, I talked about the implementation of DLP in cloud computing environments. Since then, I have seen a few examples of how security-oriented firms are working with cloud computing vendors, such as Tripwire, enStratus, and others working with cloud vendors to provide internal compliance and validation.
Meanwhile, we have seen several large-scale data breaches, including numerous attacks on Sony, that involve attacks through web servers.
A significant use case for cloud computing is to provide scalable web services, so we have an interesting and significant security intersection between deployments of web servers (often with vulnerabilities) in the cloud, and the need for web application firewall (WAF), data loss prevention (DLP), and intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) to protect the web servers and the information to which they provide access.
There are some difficult problems with protecting outward-facing cloud-based web servers, though. It might not be feasible to scale WAF, DLP, and IDS/IPS systems alongside the web servers. It may be challenging to be able to monitor and/or intercept web traffic -- especially SSL web traffic -- to protect against attacks and data loss.
A solution to this problem might be to incorporate WAF, DLP, and IDS/IPS technology into the web servers themselves, so as the web servers are scaled, the protection automatically scales also.
Meanwhile, we have seen several large-scale data breaches, including numerous attacks on Sony, that involve attacks through web servers.
A significant use case for cloud computing is to provide scalable web services, so we have an interesting and significant security intersection between deployments of web servers (often with vulnerabilities) in the cloud, and the need for web application firewall (WAF), data loss prevention (DLP), and intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) to protect the web servers and the information to which they provide access.
There are some difficult problems with protecting outward-facing cloud-based web servers, though. It might not be feasible to scale WAF, DLP, and IDS/IPS systems alongside the web servers. It may be challenging to be able to monitor and/or intercept web traffic -- especially SSL web traffic -- to protect against attacks and data loss.
A solution to this problem might be to incorporate WAF, DLP, and IDS/IPS technology into the web servers themselves, so as the web servers are scaled, the protection automatically scales also.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Bouncing Through the Cloud
A Bloomberg report over the weekend referenced an unnamed source as saying that Amazon cloud resources were used in the breach of the Sony Playstation Network. Specifically, Amazon's cloud infrastructure was not compromised, but instead used as a "relay" for the attacker to hide his/her origin.
An article on Reuters makes an (IMO) unsubstantiated claim that the attack on Sony spells doom for cloud computing. My response is that, whether or not cloud computing had anything to do with this, Sony simply had vulnerable software and apparently had insufficient controls and management in place to detect and respond to security issues. Poor security and controls are mostly unrelated to cloud technologies -- yes, there is a possibility of attacks on the hypervisor in shared infrastructure, among other things -- but none of the recent significant breaches has involved vulnerabilities in cloud computing.
What I see as a more significant exposure in cloud computing is the extent to which confidential data is being stored in the public or hybrid cloud and being provided via cloud-based servers to end users over the Internet without sufficient monitoring and controls in place. The glaring security deficiencies in cloud computing right now are the lack of visibility and the lack of security functionality that we have in private data centers, including network traffic analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), data loss prevention (DLP) systems, and audit and logging systems.
We're working at Palisade Systems to improve the security controls available in cloud computing. Palisade has virtual DLP appliances available for VMware cloud environments, and will have more good cloud security products coming up.
An article on Reuters makes an (IMO) unsubstantiated claim that the attack on Sony spells doom for cloud computing. My response is that, whether or not cloud computing had anything to do with this, Sony simply had vulnerable software and apparently had insufficient controls and management in place to detect and respond to security issues. Poor security and controls are mostly unrelated to cloud technologies -- yes, there is a possibility of attacks on the hypervisor in shared infrastructure, among other things -- but none of the recent significant breaches has involved vulnerabilities in cloud computing.
What I see as a more significant exposure in cloud computing is the extent to which confidential data is being stored in the public or hybrid cloud and being provided via cloud-based servers to end users over the Internet without sufficient monitoring and controls in place. The glaring security deficiencies in cloud computing right now are the lack of visibility and the lack of security functionality that we have in private data centers, including network traffic analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), data loss prevention (DLP) systems, and audit and logging systems.
We're working at Palisade Systems to improve the security controls available in cloud computing. Palisade has virtual DLP appliances available for VMware cloud environments, and will have more good cloud security products coming up.
Friday, April 1, 2011
From Clusters to Clouds
Over a decade ago, I was researching cluster computing -- tying together a large number of commodity computers to work together on a single, large task using a high-speed network as the interconnect. The environment was fundamentally similar to what we see in cloud-computing data centers today -- large numbers of commodity computers tied together with high-speed networks to provide a service.
At the time, I was wondering what security issues would arise in clusters. Since a cluster of computers was typically dedicated to a single user's task back in the day, it wasn't clear to me what access control and data security would be necessary other than making sure the assigned user was the only one with access to the cluster at a time. As clusters evolved and scheduling arrived to divide clusters into parts to allow multiple jobs to run at a time in clusters, I wasn't involved in cluster computing anymore and didn't see what was happening with respect to security as clusters evolved into grids and clouds.
Today, the security issues are quite visible in what has become cloud computing. Using an outside vendor's infrastructure (cloud) has becoming compelling for a number of reasons - scalability, elasticity, capital cost reductions, and more. Visibility, compliance, jurisdiction, patch management, and other issues have become prominent in such a shared environment.
Looking back, as mainframes grew from single-user, batch processing systems to multiuser, timesharing systems, mainframe operating systems gained controls and visibility to enable secure multiuser operation. Nowadays, groups like the Cloud Security Alliance are driving to improve the security and viability of cloud computing.
At the time, I was wondering what security issues would arise in clusters. Since a cluster of computers was typically dedicated to a single user's task back in the day, it wasn't clear to me what access control and data security would be necessary other than making sure the assigned user was the only one with access to the cluster at a time. As clusters evolved and scheduling arrived to divide clusters into parts to allow multiple jobs to run at a time in clusters, I wasn't involved in cluster computing anymore and didn't see what was happening with respect to security as clusters evolved into grids and clouds.
Today, the security issues are quite visible in what has become cloud computing. Using an outside vendor's infrastructure (cloud) has becoming compelling for a number of reasons - scalability, elasticity, capital cost reductions, and more. Visibility, compliance, jurisdiction, patch management, and other issues have become prominent in such a shared environment.
Looking back, as mainframes grew from single-user, batch processing systems to multiuser, timesharing systems, mainframe operating systems gained controls and visibility to enable secure multiuser operation. Nowadays, groups like the Cloud Security Alliance are driving to improve the security and viability of cloud computing.
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Re-Creating the Datacenter Via the Cloud
Over time, organizations have grappled with shifts in security resulting from changes in where and how data is stored. As PCs entered the workplace, we changed from storing data in a monitored and managed data center to a distributed, networked environment. We are still dealing with effects of this change as we implement policy and controls to identify, manage/protect, and monitor data stored on workstations and servers.
In an interesting perspective, Alan Shimel reported on an idea that General Alexander has proposed to use cloud computing to re-take control of U.S. military data by centralizing it in a well-managed cloud. The essence of the approach is to store data in the cloud and use thin clients to access the data. By implementing strong monitoring and controls in the cloud, data can be protected yet accessed wherever and whenever needed.
One of my concerns with cloud computing has been that users can sign up for cloud services and store confidential data anywhere in the world without having gone through the vetting necessary for corporate services (legal, governance & compliance, data lifecycle management, loss protection, etc). If it is conceivable for an organization (especially the size of the U.S. military) to create a single, central cloud environment and manage access & data to that cloud, then that turns my perspective of cloud computing from being fraught with dangers of data loss into one where the cloud can enable strong data security.
In an interesting perspective, Alan Shimel reported on an idea that General Alexander has proposed to use cloud computing to re-take control of U.S. military data by centralizing it in a well-managed cloud. The essence of the approach is to store data in the cloud and use thin clients to access the data. By implementing strong monitoring and controls in the cloud, data can be protected yet accessed wherever and whenever needed.
One of my concerns with cloud computing has been that users can sign up for cloud services and store confidential data anywhere in the world without having gone through the vetting necessary for corporate services (legal, governance & compliance, data lifecycle management, loss protection, etc). If it is conceivable for an organization (especially the size of the U.S. military) to create a single, central cloud environment and manage access & data to that cloud, then that turns my perspective of cloud computing from being fraught with dangers of data loss into one where the cloud can enable strong data security.
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Cloud Computing and Data Loss Prevention Implementation
I have been studying the Cloud Security Alliance's Security Guidance and other resources for the past few weeks with a focus on placement of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) capabilities.
At this time, it seems that the typical position for DLP in public clouds is in conjunction with other resources in private or public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Data-in-motion DLP systems in a cloud can be positioned logically adjacent to servers deployed in a cloud to monitor and protect information on those servers. Data-at-rest and data-in-use DLP agents can be deployed on servers in the cloud to catalog and protect data on those servers. However, there is nothing significantly new or better in these DLP implementation approaches than is currently available traditional servers.
What would be useful in cloud implementations is an API or specification to allow DLP interaction in all three major service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). VMware's vShield family of products look like a step in this direction for the IaaS model: the vShield endpoint product looks like it potentially could enable data-at-rest DLP, but the network-oriented vShield products do not appear to provide direct access to network data streams to enable data-in-motion DLP.
I am looking forward to engaging with cloud computing vendors to see if we can create a generalized specification for access to cloud systems for DLP management and remove some of the fuzzy haze enveloping the data.
Updated: Christopher Hoff blogged about the lack of security functionality in cloud services (IDS/IDP, WAF, DLP, etc) about a year and a half ago. Do we dare hope that cloud providers are becoming any more interested in security than they were then?
At this time, it seems that the typical position for DLP in public clouds is in conjunction with other resources in private or public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Data-in-motion DLP systems in a cloud can be positioned logically adjacent to servers deployed in a cloud to monitor and protect information on those servers. Data-at-rest and data-in-use DLP agents can be deployed on servers in the cloud to catalog and protect data on those servers. However, there is nothing significantly new or better in these DLP implementation approaches than is currently available traditional servers.
What would be useful in cloud implementations is an API or specification to allow DLP interaction in all three major service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS). VMware's vShield family of products look like a step in this direction for the IaaS model: the vShield endpoint product looks like it potentially could enable data-at-rest DLP, but the network-oriented vShield products do not appear to provide direct access to network data streams to enable data-in-motion DLP.
I am looking forward to engaging with cloud computing vendors to see if we can create a generalized specification for access to cloud systems for DLP management and remove some of the fuzzy haze enveloping the data.
Updated: Christopher Hoff blogged about the lack of security functionality in cloud services (IDS/IDP, WAF, DLP, etc) about a year and a half ago. Do we dare hope that cloud providers are becoming any more interested in security than they were then?
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Losing Your Data in the Cloud
In a high-profile event Monday, Google Mail disappeared for a large number of users. Google has since recovered the missing email from backups and blamed the issue on a software problem.
This is a great learning moment: if your data is stored in the cloud, does the provider adequately backup the data? In this case, even though Google keeps multiple copies of data, the software problem caused all online copies of the data to be lost. Fortunately for its users, Google had offline copies of the data and was able to restore from backups.
As a Google Mail user, I was not even aware of the policies and procedures Google has for managing the data in the Google Mail system. I, as millions of others, had signed up for Google Mail because of the free service with lots of storage. I have stayed with Google Mail because of the price and functionality, and it has been reliable for the many years I have used it.
The due diligence and risk management issues are being documented as part of cloud provider analysis best practices strategies by the Cloud Security Alliance. As we've just seen, it is important to evaluate and know a cloud provider's security and reliability plans and practices before trusting important data to that provider.
This is a great learning moment: if your data is stored in the cloud, does the provider adequately backup the data? In this case, even though Google keeps multiple copies of data, the software problem caused all online copies of the data to be lost. Fortunately for its users, Google had offline copies of the data and was able to restore from backups.
As a Google Mail user, I was not even aware of the policies and procedures Google has for managing the data in the Google Mail system. I, as millions of others, had signed up for Google Mail because of the free service with lots of storage. I have stayed with Google Mail because of the price and functionality, and it has been reliable for the many years I have used it.
The due diligence and risk management issues are being documented as part of cloud provider analysis best practices strategies by the Cloud Security Alliance. As we've just seen, it is important to evaluate and know a cloud provider's security and reliability plans and practices before trusting important data to that provider.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)