Denial: We'll never put anything in the cloud because of security/reliability/performance/etc.
Anger: You already put WHAT in the cloud? How are we going to do backups/switch providers/manage identity/etc.???
Bargaining: OK, we'll move X into the cloud if/when the cloud becomes secure/reliable/etc.
Depression: The CFO/CEO/etc. wants us to start using cloud to save money/reduce costs/expand functionality. We can't use the cloud. What about my job running the data center? What about our bandwidth? What about PCI DSS/HIPAA/GLBA?
Acceptance: It works, I can do more to enable my company's business, and reduce capital expenditures. Let's put everything into the cloud!
Seriously, I have had some of these reactions myself. I hear some of these reactions from people when we talk about using cloud services and realize there truly is a road to acceptance for many people.
Friday, August 12, 2011
Changing Face of "Spam" Email
As a network engineer involved in bringing up some of the first Internet connections in the upper midwest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I also managed email systems in the 1990s as spam email started becoming a nuisance. In the past decade, spam has been more than a nuisance - email systems must have effective spam filters to keep email usable for end users.
There is an interesting trend I see now - I am getting a fair bit of relevant business-related marketing email in my inbox. The amount of "online pharmacy" spam is way down, but I still get a fair amount of complete junk, including a lot of Cyrillic and Mandarin spam that is completely unintelligible to me. Fortunately, my company's spam filter, including up-to-date SpamAssassin rule lists and a good blacklist, are doing a good job discarding and classifying the useless spam, while allowing through the reasonable marketing queries (I think).
A few years back, the sales team at my employer emailed potential customers asking if they could setup meetings to introduce the company's software - not an unusual email message, especially nowadays. One particular recipient hit the roof and replied with a rant worthy of a response to the first massive Usenet spam from the green card lawyers back in the day.
Are people's attitudes changing about spam? Is there an increasing acceptance of reasonable marketing-type contact via email?
There is an interesting trend I see now - I am getting a fair bit of relevant business-related marketing email in my inbox. The amount of "online pharmacy" spam is way down, but I still get a fair amount of complete junk, including a lot of Cyrillic and Mandarin spam that is completely unintelligible to me. Fortunately, my company's spam filter, including up-to-date SpamAssassin rule lists and a good blacklist, are doing a good job discarding and classifying the useless spam, while allowing through the reasonable marketing queries (I think).
A few years back, the sales team at my employer emailed potential customers asking if they could setup meetings to introduce the company's software - not an unusual email message, especially nowadays. One particular recipient hit the roof and replied with a rant worthy of a response to the first massive Usenet spam from the green card lawyers back in the day.
Are people's attitudes changing about spam? Is there an increasing acceptance of reasonable marketing-type contact via email?
Thursday, August 11, 2011
Security Technology Musings
Each security technology that comes along has its set of "use cases" -- that is, it improves confidentiality, integrity, or availability for certain uses. Trying to apply that security technology outside of its useful situations results in either a false sense of security or complete failure.
For example, full disk encryption is a useful security technology intended to keep the entire contents of a disk drive relatively safe from an attacker who might steal the physical disk drive (or the system in which it is installed, such as a laptop). However, when the computer is in operation, full disk encryption has nothing to do with whether files can be accessed -- that is the function of the access control technology built into the operating system.
When we began building Data Loss Prevention (DLP) some years ago, my idea was that content analysis (looking at the textual content of a document) was a powerful way to determine whether a document should be shared outside of an organization. However, the documents that would be visible to the DLP system for analysis would depend on a number of factors: logical placement of the DLP functionality in an organization's computing system, whether the DLP system would be able to see documents as plaintext, and how an adversary might try to circumvent the system.
As we have further developed DLP technology and the industry has settled on standard implementations (data-in-motion, data-at-rest, data-at-use), customers have become comfortable with the functionality and capability of DLP systems. We're finding that DLP is a very useful tool -- helping significantly reduce exposure of confidential information, and improving standing in risk & compliance audits -- for our customers. It's become one part of the security management arsenal.
For example, full disk encryption is a useful security technology intended to keep the entire contents of a disk drive relatively safe from an attacker who might steal the physical disk drive (or the system in which it is installed, such as a laptop). However, when the computer is in operation, full disk encryption has nothing to do with whether files can be accessed -- that is the function of the access control technology built into the operating system.
When we began building Data Loss Prevention (DLP) some years ago, my idea was that content analysis (looking at the textual content of a document) was a powerful way to determine whether a document should be shared outside of an organization. However, the documents that would be visible to the DLP system for analysis would depend on a number of factors: logical placement of the DLP functionality in an organization's computing system, whether the DLP system would be able to see documents as plaintext, and how an adversary might try to circumvent the system.
As we have further developed DLP technology and the industry has settled on standard implementations (data-in-motion, data-at-rest, data-at-use), customers have become comfortable with the functionality and capability of DLP systems. We're finding that DLP is a very useful tool -- helping significantly reduce exposure of confidential information, and improving standing in risk & compliance audits -- for our customers. It's become one part of the security management arsenal.
Friday, August 5, 2011
Are Anti-Virus and a Firewall Enough?
I thought after all the commotion from the many significant data breaches of the past several months that data security would be top-of-mind at nearly every company. Perhaps people outside the information security industry have become tired of the breach news, or perhaps the lesson didn't sink in. Maybe more likely is the idea that "we haven't been hit yet, so we don't need more security yet."
Computer viruses were such a big problem in the late 80's and 90's (and still today) that companies became accustomed to buying anti-virus software.
The Internet was such a wild and wooly place that companies didn't dare connect their LANs to the 'net without a firewall of some sort to keep the outside world from instantly pwning everything.
People in the information security industry know these two main tools, anti-virus and firewalls, have significant limitations. Anti-virus tools have limited effectiveness in the era of morphing malware. Firewalls often are configured to allow HTTP/HTTPS (web traffic) and SMTP (email traffic) without any limits, and everyone always has browsers and email clients running. The result is that attackers have a fairly easy time exploiting problems with browsers, email programs, and the users themselves.
Today, organizations need deeper defenses to handle the problems. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS/IPS), Data Loss Prevention (DLP), patch management, web filter, and Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) are the important systems to have in place in addition to firewalls and anti-virus.
Web servers need to have a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of them to protect against attacks on the applications running on the web servers. If you have a good hosting provider for your web server, you may already have a WAF protecting your web server.
If you don't have these systems in place, you can prioritize based on an analysis of your organization's risks.
Computer viruses were such a big problem in the late 80's and 90's (and still today) that companies became accustomed to buying anti-virus software.
The Internet was such a wild and wooly place that companies didn't dare connect their LANs to the 'net without a firewall of some sort to keep the outside world from instantly pwning everything.
People in the information security industry know these two main tools, anti-virus and firewalls, have significant limitations. Anti-virus tools have limited effectiveness in the era of morphing malware. Firewalls often are configured to allow HTTP/HTTPS (web traffic) and SMTP (email traffic) without any limits, and everyone always has browsers and email clients running. The result is that attackers have a fairly easy time exploiting problems with browsers, email programs, and the users themselves.
Today, organizations need deeper defenses to handle the problems. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS/IPS), Data Loss Prevention (DLP), patch management, web filter, and Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) are the important systems to have in place in addition to firewalls and anti-virus.
Web servers need to have a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of them to protect against attacks on the applications running on the web servers. If you have a good hosting provider for your web server, you may already have a WAF protecting your web server.
If you don't have these systems in place, you can prioritize based on an analysis of your organization's risks.
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